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Advertising Regulation and the Protection of Children-Consumers in the European Union: 
In the Best Interests of ... Commercial Operators? 
 
Amandine Garde, School of Law, University of Durham  
 
 
Abstract:  
This article argues that, despite its promise to mainstream the best interests of the child into all EU 
policies, the European Commission has failed to ensure that the EU internal market and consumer 
policies, which are at the heart of the EU legal order, adequately protect children. Two main pieces 
of EU legislation illustrate the argument: the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive.  
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Introduction: 
 
The EU internal market has always been at the very heart of European integration. It lays down that 
goods, persons, services and capital shall move freely from one Member State to another in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.
1
 Its rationale is to stimulate competition by opening 
                                                 
1
 Article 26(2) TFEU (ex-Article 14(2) EC). 
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up frontiers so that consumers have a larger choice of goods and services and businesses benefit 
from larger markets and more opportunities to establish themselves abroad. Market integration 
requires, however, that consumers are sufficiently informed about the goods and services available 
to them.
2
 This is why advertising is regarded as playing a central role in the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. Not only does the freedom to advertise allow commercial 
operators to promote their goods and services in all 27 EU Member States and thus ensure that 
consumer habits do not crystallise along national lines, but it also fits in with the model of 
consumer protection promoted by EU political institutions, which relies on the explicit assumption 
that consumers must be informed in order to be sufficiently confident to engage in cross-border 
transactions and take full advantage of the opportunities a wider market offers.
3 
As a result, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) protects the right of individuals and companies to 
promote their goods and services,
4
 which derives not only from their right to engage in economic 
                                                 
2
 Most EU consumer legislation is based on Article 114(1) TFEU (ex-Article 95(1) EC). This clearly stems from both 
the wording of Article 169 TFEU (ex-Article 153 EC), which explicitly refers to Article 114 TFEU and the wording 
of Article 114(3), which explicitly provides for the obligation of EU institutions to ensure a high level of consumer 
protection when adopting harmonising measures on the basis of Article 114(1). The mainstreaming provision 
previously contained in Article 153(2) EC has become a provision of general application enshrined in Article 13 
TFEU: ‘consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other Union 
policies and activities’. 
3
 ‘Empowered and informed consumers can more easily make changes in lifestyle and consumption patterns 
contributing to the improvement of their health, more sustainable lifestyles and a low carbon economy’: (European c 
Commission, 2007a, 11). Note, however, that the information paradigm thus promoted may only be effective if the 
information is of sufficient quality to guide consumer choices and effectively allows them to ‘protect’ themselves 
(Weatherill, 2005, 9). 
4
 Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) provides that 
‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’. The case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that all forms of expression are protected under this provision, 
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activities and the general commitment, in the EU context, to a market economy based upon free 
competition, but also from their inherent entitlement freely to express and receive views on any 
topic, including the merits of the goods or services that they market.
5
  
 
Nevertheless, if economic integration increases opportunities for consumers and businesses alike, it 
may also give rise to difficulties when the fundamental principle of free movement conflicts with 
other fundamental interests such as public health, consumer or child protection. In particular, the 
freedom of business operators to promote their goods and services may facilitate the marketing of 
goods and services whose consumption should be either avoided altogether or strictly limited 
(including tobacco, alcoholic beverages, unhealthy food, as well as gambling services). The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
including commercial expression which consists in the provision of information, expression of ideas or 
communication of images as part of the promotion of a commercial activity and the concomitant right to receive 
such communications. See, in particular, Markt Intern v Germany Series A no 165 (1990) 12 EHRR 161, paras 25 
and 26; Groppera v Switzerland Series A no 173 (1990) 12 EHRR 321, para 55; and Casado Coca v Spain Series A 
no 285 (1994) 18 EHRR 1, paras 35 and 36; Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v Austria Series A no 9605/03 
(14.11.08), para 31. The ECJ has upheld the principle of freedom of expression as a general principle of EU law, the 
observance of which it ensures. To do so, it draws upon the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The ECHR has special significance in that respect: see, 
inter alia, Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, para 41; Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR 
I-1611, para 37; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, para 25; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] 
ECR I-5659, para 71; Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, para 48; and Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament 
and Council (Tobacco Advertising II) [2006] ECR I-11573, para 154. See also Article 11(1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which states that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers’. 
5
 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising II) 
[2006] ECR I-11573, para 154. 
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concerns are particularly acute for children who are more credulous and inexperienced than adults 
and therefore less able to distinguish the commercial intent of advertising. The impact of 
advertising on children’s consumption choices, health and well-being is an integral part of the 
broader debates on the commercialisation of childhood (see, for example, Linn, 2005), particularly 
in the EU context where goods and services are subjected to the principle of free movement, thus 
calling on a transnational response to the concerns advertising raises for child welfare. 
 
Free movement has never been unlimited, and it is universally accepted that the proper functioning 
of the internal market requires that certain non-commercial interests should be sufficiently 
protected. In particular, public health, consumer and child protection may all be invoked to limit the 
free movement of goods and services, and more specifically the right of commercial operators to 
promote their goods and services. The question therefore arises as to how potentially conflicting 
interests – the free movement of goods and services, including the fundamental freedom of 
commercial operators to promote their goods and services, on the one hand, and public health, 
consumer or child protection, on the other – should be balanced against each other. This 
contribution focuses more specifically on the extent to which EU institutions have taken the 
principle of the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in the development of the core 
area of internal market policy, as mandated by the Commission Communication of 4 July 2006 
(European Commission, 2006), by Article 24 of the EU Charter and, following the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, by Article 3 TEU. It argues that the Commission Communication has yet to 
play a role in shaping EU internal market and consumer law. Indeed, discussion of such issues has 
barely featured at all in discussions relating to the development of the EU’s broader Children’s 
Rights Strategy. It starts by acknowledging that the EU has recognised that children constitute a 
group of particularly vulnerable consumers and has adopted legislation intended to protect them 
from unfair commercial practices. Nevertheless, the threshold it has laid down to assess the fairness 
of commercial practices is insufficient and, as such, incapable of protecting children adequately 
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from the negative impact advertising has on them (I). The same observation may be made when 
considering the debates which have surrounded the adoption of another key piece of EU legislation, 
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (II). 
 
I. The Explicit Recognition that Children are Vulnerable Consumers: the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive 
 
Children, who make up more than a fifth of the EU population, represent three markets: 
 the primary market, as they have more and more buying power with their own money to 
spend;
6
  
 the parental market, as they play a major role in influencing what their parents buy;7 and 
 the future market, as it is likely that they stick to the consumption habits which they have 
acquired as children when they grow older: In relation to food choices, for example, 
evidence emphasises the need to focus obesity prevention policies on children in light of the 
fact that an obese child is more likely to become an obese adult if he/she does not change 
his/her eating habit.
8
  
 
It should therefore not come as a surprise that advertisers have developed marketing techniques 
specifically designed to seduce young audiences. The growing number and range of commercial 
messages relied upon extend far beyond traditional media advertising and involve activities such as 
online marketing, sponsorship and peer-to-peer marketing (Buckingham, 2009). The development 
                                                 
6
 Recent estimates suggest that children in the UK receive an average of £10 per week in pocket money and £16 in ad 
hoc handouts (Buckingham, 2009). 
7
 In the UK alone, overall spending on children (including childcare and education) amounts to around £100 billion per 
year (Buckingham, 2009). 
8
 Overweight children enter adulthood with a raised risk of adult obesity of up to seventeen-fold (Hauner, 2004, 219). 
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of integrated marketing strategies, relying on a broad range of media, therefore increases the 
exposure of children to advertising. Moreover, commercial messages have become all the more 
effective as they rely on the use of marketing techniques such as cartoon characters, licensed 
characters, equity brands and celebrities, to which young audiences are particularly vulnerable (see 
in particular McGinnis et al., 2006, and Harris et al., 2009). Their impact is even more powerful 
since companies tend to use ‘integrated marketing communications’, in which promotional 
activities range across different media platforms and which often blur the distinction between 
promotional and other content (Buckingham, 2009). These techniques contribute to reinforcing the 
power of advertising. To reduce the potentially injurious impact of advertising on children, it is 
therefore necessary to tackle both components, namely the exposure of children to advertising and 
the power of advertising on children.  
 
Directive 2005/29 on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, one of the cornerstones of 
EU consumer policy, explicitly recognises that children constitute a group of particularly vulnerable 
consumers deserving, as such, special protection. This directive introduces the first EU-wide ban on 
all unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices (for commentaries in English, see in 
particular: Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, 2005; Garde and Haravon, 2006; Howells et al., 2006; Stuyck 
et al., 2006; Micklitz et al., 2008; Weatherill and Bernitz, 2006).
9
 Its key provision is Article 5 
which prohibits all such practices and provides that a practice will be considered unfair if it satisfies 
two criteria: it must be contrary to the rules of professional diligence and materially distort or be 
likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of a consumer, that is ‘to appreciably impair the 
consumer’s ability to make an informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to take a 
transactional decision which he would not have taken otherwise’.10 In EU consumer law, the 
                                                 
9
 Directive 2005/29, OJ 2005 L 149/22. 
10
 Article 2(e). 
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benchmark used to assess the economic behaviour of ‘a consumer’ has traditionally been that of the 
‘average consumer’ (see Weatherill, 2007, for a discussion of the case law of the ECJ). This is 
confirmed by Article 5(2) of the Directive. Nevertheless, to highlight the special vulnerability of 
certain groups of consumers, Article 5(3) of the UCP Directive introduces – along the average 
consumer test – the benchmark of the average member of a group of particularly vulnerable 
consumers: 
 
‘Commercial practices which are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour only of a 
clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly vulnerable to the practice of the 
underlying product because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way 
which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee, shall be assessed from the 
perspective of the average member of that group. This is without prejudice to the common and 
legitimate advertising practice of making exaggerated statements or statements which are not 
meant to be taken literally.’11 
 
By referring to the age as a criterion for determining the impact of a commercial practice on 
consumers, the UCP Directive explicitly acknowledges that children-consumers deserve special 
protection.
12
 This is confirmed by Point 28 of Annex I of the Directive which provides that 
‘including in an advertisement a direct exhortation to children to buy advertised products or 
persuade their parents or other adults to buy advertised products for them' is an unfair commercial 
                                                 
11
 See also Recital 19 of the Preamble. In any event, no assessment is required of ‘each individual’s circumstances, 
which would be unworkable’ (Common Position of November 2004). 
12
 Measures focusing specifically on the special vulnerability of children had been previously adopted in EU consumer 
law, not least the Toy Safety Directive: Directive 88/378 OJ 1988 L 187/1, as amended by Directive 93/68, OJ 1993 
L 220/1. An extended amendment process led to the adoption, on 18 June 2009, of Directive 2009/48, which repeals 
and replaces Directive 88/378, OJ 2009 L 170/1. 
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practice and should therefore be prohibited.
13
 Nevertheless, the wording of both Article 5(3) and 
Point 28 is so restrictive that it does not support the argument that the UCP Directive upholds the 
best interests of the child.  
 
The first criticism relates to the second and final sentence of the general clause which allows 
commercial operators to rely on ‘exaggerated statements or statements which are not meant to be 
taken literally’. This provision is striking, insofar as it implies not only that EU institutions have 
taken a clear stance that advertising to children should be allowed, but also that advertisers are 
perfectly entitled to rely on exaggerated statements to advertise their goods and services to them. 
This does not take into account the fact that it is precisely in the case of vulnerable groups such as 
children that exaggerations can be taken literally. Children perceive commercials very differently 
from adults and are more likely to be influenced than them by what they see. Most children do not 
begin to develop the ability to distinguish between advertising and programming until the age of 8 
and they often do not fully understand the purpose of advertising until the age of 11 or 12 (Ramsay, 
1996). Nevertheless, understanding the purpose of advertising is essential to develop a critical, 
                                                 
13
 The Annex is intended to give a more concrete flavour to the general definition of unfairness. It lists thirty-one 
commercial practices which are considered unfair in all circumstances. The list, which is applicable in all the 
Member States and can only be modified by revision of the Directive, is not exhaustive; however, if a consumer 
claims that his/her economic behaviour has been distorted as a result of a practice which is not listed, s/he will have 
to establish that the practice is indeed unfair. The list therefore reverses the burden of proof by laying down a 
presumption of unfairness. In other words, if Annex I is not exhaustive of all unfair commercial practices, it is 
exhaustive of the commercial practices which are presumed to be unfair. This has been confirmed by the ECJ in 
three preliminary rulings: Joined Cases C-261 and 299/07 VTB-VAB [2009] I-2949; Case C-304/08 Plus 
Warengesellschaft [2010] ECR I-xxx, judgment of 14 January 2010, not yet reported; and Case C-540/08 
Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag [2010] ECR I-xxx, judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECJ of 9 
November 2010, not yet reported. All ECJ judgments are available at <www.curia.eu>. 
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questioning attitude and distinguish between entertainment and commercial communications.
14
 It is 
precisely on the basis of this rationale that freedom of commercial expression has been granted 
constitutional protection: consumers must be free to receive commercial information so as to make 
informed consumption choices. One may regret that the UCP Directive does not in any way 
question whether this rationale is indeed applicable to children, whose cognitive abilities may not 
allow them to make such ‘empowered’ choices. The travaux préparatoires do not display any 
evidence that the question whether advertising to children is inherently unfair has been at all 
discussed. It has been argued that commercial operators should not be able to exploit children’s 
inexperience and credulity for commercial gain and insinuate consumerist values into childhood 
(Linn, 2005). This is particularly so as the constant commercial pressures to which children are 
subjected as a result of the omnipresence of marketing may inhibit them from playing creatively 
(Linn, 2008). The UCP Directive, however, does not allow for this argument to be made.
15
 
 
The second criticism relates to the benchmark itself which the UCP Directive has set to assess the 
unfairness of a commercial practice directed at children. Article 5(3) requires that the group of 
vulnerable consumers in question must not only be ‘clearly identifiable’ but also ‘particularly 
vulnerable’; there is, however, no indication as to how the threshold should be determined. If 
children of 12 years old are better equipped than younger children to understand the commercial 
purpose of advertising, this does not mean that they are as able as adults to adopt the necessary 
                                                 
14
 As regards adolescents, the issue may be more one of self-control and peer identification (Cutler et al., 2003). 
15
 More specific concerns have also been raised, and in particular that much of the goods and services marketed to 
children are not conducive to healthy consumption choices. In particular, most food marketing in Europe is for foods 
high in fat, salt and sugar and has been recognised as a factor (though, admittedly, one factor among several others) 
of overweight and obesity, causing elevated blood pressure, cholesterol and blood sugar levels, and leading to type 2 
diabetes – the latter a serious obesity and diet-related disease which until recent years only affected adults, not 
children. The legislative response required to address childhood overweight and obesity is discussed more fully 
below. 
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critical stance towards the good or service advertised to them and act as ‘reasonably well informed 
and circumspect consumers’. Would they nonetheless be considered as a ‘particularly vulnerable’ 
group within the meaning of Article 5(3)? One would hope so, but there is no evidence that this 
question has been given the consideration it requires to ensure that the Directive duly upholds the 
best interests of the child. 
 
The analysis of the scope of Point 28 of the Annex reinforces the argument that the UCP Directive 
is unlikely to limit meaningfully the development of marketing techniques specifically intended to 
induce children to buy or put pressure on their parents to buy. As stated above, Point 28 bans direct 
exhortations to children to buy advertised products or persuade their parents or other adults to buy 
advertised products for them. This implies a contrario that forms of indirect exhortations to 
children are not prohibited. Commercial communications tend not to ‘directly’ call upon children 
either to buy a specific good or service or to use their ‘pester power’ so that their parents buy the 
good or service in question on their behalf. Rather, marketing to children tends to be covert. This is 
even more so in light of the development of numerous marketing techniques specifically designed 
to attract the attention of children, such as host selling, character merchandising and the use of 
celebrities, as well as the integration of marketing into programmes (product placement, 
advergaming…), which all accentuate the difficulties for children to grasp the commercial intent of 
marketing practices. For example, is it not arguable that it is unfair for a food operator to market its 
unhealthy meals to children by focusing their attention on the collectable toys they will be ‘given’ if 
they buy or get their parents to buy the meals in question? The UCP Directive does not suggest that 
it is.
16
 Notwithstanding the effectiveness of character merchandising and similar marketing 
techniques, which are specifically designed to capture children’s imagination, so as to induce them 
to buy or put pressure on their parents to buy the advertised good or service for them, they are not 
                                                 
16
 The problem is similar when characters such as Kellogg’s Tony the Tiger are used by food operators to capture the 
imagination of children and make them want breakfast cereals with a sugar content of 37%. 
11 
 
categorised as unfair within the scope of the prohibition laid down by the UCP Directive.  
 
These remarks, which suggest that the UCP Directive has failed to ensure that the two components 
of marketing – exposure and power – are dealt with effectively, are compounded by the fact that the 
UCP Directive is a measure of full harmonisation which does not allow Member States to adopt 
more protective measures on their territories.
17
 Taking the best interests of the child as a primary 
consideration would have warranted a stronger regulatory intervention from EU political 
institutions. 
 
The UCP Directive only applies in the absence of more specific rules.
18
 One therefore needs to turn 
to other relevant instruments of EU law to determine whether the EU can claim that it has taken the 
best interests of the child as a primary consideration in its internal market and consumer policies. In 
particular, with regard to advertising to children, Point 28 of the Annex explicitly states that it is 
‘without prejudice to Directive 89/552’.  
 
II. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
 
Directive 89/552, which is often referred to as the Television Without Frontiers Directive or TVWF 
Directive,
19
 has now been replaced by Directive 2010/13 on Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) 
Directive.
20
  
                                                 
17
 The UCP Directive therefore departs from the method of minimum harmonisation traditionally used in EU consumer 
law (Article 3(5)). 
18
 Article 3(4) confirms that the UCP Directive is a framework legislative instrument: in the case of conflict between the 
provisions of this Directive and other [EU] rules regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices, the latter 
shall prevail and apply to those specific aspects. 
19
 OJ 1989 L298/23. 
20
 OJ 2010 L 95/1. 
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The TVWF Directive was intended to ensure the free movement of broadcasting services within the 
European Union. Its primary purpose therefore was to facilitate the functioning of the internal 
market. The free movement of broadcasting services within the EU would only have been 
acceptable to all the Member States, however, if provisions were inserted to ensure that potentially 
competing public interests were sufficiently protected across the EU. The TVWF Directive thus laid 
down minimum standards binding on all the Member States. In particular, it explicitly provided that 
the broadcasts benefiting from free movement should not contain harmful material, not least for 
children. As regards advertising regulation more specifically, the TVWF Directive contained 
provisions designed to restrict the amount of advertising to which children were exposed. Article 11 
imposed scheduling restrictions.
21
 Moreover, Article 16 contained a general clause prohibiting 
television advertising causing moral or physical detriment to minors. In particular, it banned direct 
exhortation to minors to buy a product or a service by exploiting their inexperience or credulity and 
television advertising which directly encouraged minors to persuade their parents or others to 
purchase the goods or services being advertised. Nevertheless, television advertising to children 
was not altogether banned and restrictions imposed were unlikely to be effective in curbing 
significantly their exposure, except for tobacco products, as well as medicines and medical 
treatments available only on prescription, whose advertising was prohibited. The TVWF Directive 
suggested that children were perceived as particularly vulnerable, but the provisions relating to 
advertising to children were insufficient to alleviate the growing concerns associated with the 
commerialisation of childhood.  
 
The EU was given a chance to re-assess its legislative framework in light of the principle of the best 
interests of the child during the revision process of the TVWF Directive by the AVMS Directive. 
                                                 
21
 ‘Children’s programmes, when their scheduled duration is less than 30 minutes, shall not be interrupted by 
advertising or by teleshopping’ (Article 11(5)).  
13 
 
The reform led to three major changes of direct relevance to our purposes:  
 
- the extension of the scope of the TVWF Directive to new media, not least the Internet and 
video-on demand services;  
- the extension of its scope to new marketing techniques, not least product placement; and  
- the extension of its scope to new problems, not least the regulation of food marketing to 
children.  
 
It is not suggested that the need for reform originated from the need to re-assess the TVWF 
Directive in light of the principle of the best interests of the child. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing 
out that the discussions surrounding the revision of the TVWF Directive took place at the same time 
as the discussions surrounding the adoption by the Commission of its Communication on the EU 
Strategy on Children’s Rights (European Commission, 2006). One could therefore have hoped that 
the best interests of the child would have been considered in the revision process. Regrettably, this 
does not, however, appear to have been the case. 
 
As regards the rules intended to limit the exposure of children to marketing, they vary depending on 
the marketing technique at stake. The AVMS Directive distinguishes different categories of 
audiovisual commercial communications, including advertising, teleshopping, sponsorship and 
product placement.
22
 Article 20 of the AVMS Directive is similar to Article 11 of the TVWF 
Directive and provides that children’s programmes of less than thirty minutes may not be 
                                                 
22
 Article 1(h) of the AVMS Directive defines the notion of audiovisual commercial communications as ‘images with or 
without sound which are designed to promote, directly or indirectly, the goods, services or image of a natural or 
legal entity pursuing an economic activity. Such images accompany or are included in a programme in return for 
payment or for similar consideration or for self-promotional purposes. Forms of audiovisual commercial 
communication include, inter alia, television advertising, sponsorship, teleshopping and product placement’.  
14 
 
interrupted by television advertising or teleshopping. If their scheduled duration is thirty minutes or 
longer, they may be interrupted once for each scheduled period of at least thirty minutes. Article 11 
prohibits product placement in all children’s programmes, irrespective of their duration,23 while 
Article 10(4) grants an option to Member States to prohibit the showing of a sponsorship logo 
during children’s programmes. These provisions show that the AVMS Directive merely limits the 
amount of marketing to which children may be exposed without banning marketing to children as 
such. Moreover, the AVMS Directive does not define the notion of ‘children’s programmes’.24 The 
Hieronymi Report noted this shortcoming and suggested that, ‘in the absence of a uniform EU-wide 
definition of “children” and “children’s programmes” for the purposes of this directive’, New 
Recital 33A should be inserted in the Preamble and provide that ‘in order to reach an adequate level 
of protection of minors, the national regulatory authorities should determine time-zones for children 
and define the programmes aimed at children’.25 Recent findings such as those published by Ofcom, 
the independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries,  suggest 
that around 70% of the time children spend watching television in the UK is outside designated 
children’s viewing times, thus highlighting the importance of this question. 26 Consequently, 
                                                 
23
 One should note, however, that the AVMS Directive does not ban product integration (i.e. when no remuneration or 
similar consideration is provided for). One may nonetheless wonder whether this distinction is justified from a child 
protection point of view: whether the placement is remunerated or not, children will be exposed to the presence of 
branded goods and their consumption choices likely to be influenced (Woods, 2007). 
24
 The AVMS Directive is a measure of partial harmonisation which leaves it to Member States to define at national 
level the terms which have been left undefined at EU level. 
25
 Amendment 35. 
26
 Ofcom recently noted that ‘adult airtime accounted for 67.2% of children’s viewing in 2009. For 4-9 year olds, the 
figure was lower at 54.4% and higher for 10-15 year olds at 79.8%’ (Ofcom, 2010, para 4.14). In the UK, a 
programme of particular appeal to children under 16 would be deemed to be one that attracted an audience index of 
120 for this age group. If a programme attracts an under-16 audience in a proportion similar to that group’s presence 
15 
 
children will not be sufficiently protected from the adverse effects of advertising if the notion of 
‘children’s programme’ is defined too narrowly.27 It is unfortunate, however, that the final version 
of the AVMS Directive does not acknowledge, let alone address, this important concern. 
 
As regards the rules relating to the content of the commercial communications to which children are 
exposed, Article 9(1)(g) provides, after stating the general principle that ‘audiovisual commercial 
communications shall not cause moral or physical detriment to minors’, that: 
 
- they shall not directly exhort minors to buy or hire a product or service by exploiting 
their inexperience or credulity; 
- they shall not directly encourage minors to persuade their parents or others to purchase 
the goods or services being advertised;  
- they shall not exploit the special trust minors place in parents, teachers or other persons; 
and 
- they shall not unreasonably show minors in dangerous situations. 
 
The wording of Article 9(1) (g) is very similar to the wording of Article 16 of the TVWF Directive; 
in particular the use of the word ‘directly’ restricts its scope significantly. It is noteworthy that 
during the revision process which led to the replacement of the TVWF Directive by the AVMS 
Directive, the Hieronymi Report suggested that the scope of the Directive should be extended to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
in the population as a whole, it is said to index at 100. So an index of 120 is an over-representation of that group by 
20%. 
27
 The Recommendations for an International Code on Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children 
provide that ‘both the absolute number of children likely to be watching or listening and the number of children as a 
proportion of the overall audience should be taken into account’ (IOTF and Consumer International, 2008, Article 
5(1)). 
16 
 
cover both direct and indirect exhortations to children:  
 
‘Audiovisual commercial communications must not cause moral or physical detriment to 
minors. Therefore, it shall not directly or indirectly exhort minors to buy a product or 
service by exploiting their inexperience or credulity, directly or indirectly encourage them to 
persuade their parents or others to purchase the goods or services being advertised, exploit 
the special trust minors place in parents, teachers or other persons, especially role models or 
persons exercising authority, or unreasonably show minors in dangerous or degrading 
situations unless justified for learning or training purposes’.28  
 
It is not by pure coincidence that the justification invoked to propose this amendment was the need 
to protect the rights of the child. The Commission was then about to adopt its Children’s Rights 
Strategy. It is all the more regrettable that the suggestion to extend the prohibition of marketing to 
children to indirect exhortations was not subsequently mentioned as a worthy consideration in the 
legislative process. This would have allowed for a thorough debate on the value of advertising and 
its impact on children. 
 
Product specific rules 
 
The marketing of certain goods, whose consumption should either be prohibited or strictly 
regulated, has attracted specific criticisms. The original version of the TVWF Directive already 
banned tobacco advertising and the advertising of cigarettes and other tobacco products, as well as 
the advertising of medicinal products and medical treatments available only on prescription. It also 
banned the advertising of alcoholic beverages aimed specifically at minors. Following the adoption 
of the AVMS Directive, these restrictions have been extended to cover all other forms of 
                                                 
28
 Amendment 68 (emphasis contained in the original text). 
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audiovisual commercial communications.
29
 Furthermore, in light of research findings that food 
marketing impacts negatively on children’s food choices and dietary patterns, the question of how 
food marketing to children should be regulated has gained momentum in Europe and beyond (see, 
in particular, Hastings et al., 2003 and 2008). Consequently, while obesity prevention was not part 
of the EU agenda when the TVWF Directive was adopted in 1989, it had become one of its growing 
health concerns by the time the AVMS Directive was published in December 2007 (European 
Commission, 2007b; Garde, 2010a). The latest figures published by the European Commission 
confirm that overweight and obesity should remain priority items on the EU Public Health Agenda: 
overweight now affects between 30 and 70% of adults in EU countries, obesity between 10 and 
30%. Childhood obesity is more difficult to measure, but the World Health Organisation has 
estimated that, in 2007, on average 24% of the children aged 6-9 years old were overweight or 
obese (European Commission, 2010). 
 
During the consultations which took place as part of the AVMS Directive legislative process, 
several stakeholders called for the prohibition, or at least the strict regulation, of unhealthy food 
advertising to children. Reflecting (in part at least) their concerns, Article 9(2) of the AVMS 
Directive provides: 
 
‘Member States and the Commission shall encourage media service providers to develop 
codes of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial communication, 
accompanying or included in children’s programmes, of foods and beverages containing 
nutrients and substances with a nutritional or physiological effect, in particular those such as 
fat, trans-fatty acids, salt/sodium and sugars, excessive intakes of which in the overall diet 
are not recommended.’ 
                                                 
29
 See Article 9(d), (e) and (f) applying respectively to tobacco products, alcoholic beverages and medicinal products 
and medical treatments available only on prescription. 
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This approach is in line with the position which the Commission’s Directorate General for Health 
and Consumers adopted on the same issue in its Obesity Prevention White Paper of May 2007 and 
in which it stated its preference, at this stage, ‘to keep the existing voluntary approach at EU level 
due to the fact that it can potentially act quickly and effectively to tackle rising overweight and 
obesity rates’ (European Commission, 2007b, 6). 
 
If it is welcome that Article 9(2) recognises the negative influence of unhealthy food marketing on 
children’s dietary choices, it remains that its scope is stricly circumscribed and raises questions as 
to its effectiveness. First, the wording of Article 9(2) is unclear. In particular, the phrase 
‘inappropriate audiovisual commercial communication’ seems to leave the food industry with an 
important margin of discretion. If it is arguable that all forms of commercial communication for 
unhealthy food directed at children are inappropriate (World Health Organisation, 2010), this is not 
what the wording of Article 9(2) suggests. Rather, it implies that there are appropriate and 
inappropriate unhealthy food adverts, thus putting the onus on the industry to tackle only the latter 
in its codes of conduct. One could imagine that using celebrities or cartoon characters would be 
viewed as inappropriate, as these techniques are particularly effective in detracting children’s 
attention away from the actual product, whereas adverts that would not rely on these or similar 
techniques would not be regarded as ‘inappropriate’. Such an approach, apart from being 
ineffective, would be extremely cynical, as it would leave the industry with a broad margin of 
discretion in relation to the content of its codes of conduct. It would be comforting to believe that 
this provision was drafted with an unintentional error, rather than cynically... The disappointment is 
accentuated by the fact that Article 9(2) only requires Member States and the Commission to 
‘encourage’ media service providers to develop codes of conduct on the advertising of unhealthy 
food to children and to monitor the fulfilment of this commitment. There is no duty to ensure that 
19 
 
such codes are indeed adopted and that they are sufficiently effective.
30
   
 
Secondly, Article 9(2) only requires that the industry should limit inappropriate unhealthy food 
marketing ‘accompanying or included in children’s programming’. As stated above, however, the 
AVMS Directive does not define what is meant by ‘children's programming’. Consequently, the EU 
Pledge, one of the main self-regulatory initiatives which have been adopted to comply with Article 
9(2), only applies when at least 50% of the audience is made of children of less than 12. This 
percentage is extremely high and will leave a range of popular programmes with children outside 
the scope of the food industry’s commitment to abstain from advertising during children’s 
programmes. Alternatively, and probably more effectively, it is possible to define a ‘watershed’ – 
i.e. a time in the evening after which the child audience is likely to be small and before which it is 
not allowed to advertise to children or, more specifically, promote foods which are high in saturated 
fats, trans-fatty acids, free sugars, or salt. This option would have the advantage of being both 
effective and easy to administer. One should also note that the narrow remit of the EU Pledge raises 
the question of the groups of children who need regulatory protection: which age group should be 
protected from unhealthy food marketing? The EU Pledge applies a threshold of 12. If it is 
generally accepted that children cannot fully grasp the commercial intent of advertising until the age 
of 11 or 12 and that children below 12 years of age should therefore be protected, this does not 
mean that children who are more than 12 years old are unaffected by unhealthy food marketing. 
Older children will normally respond to the persuasive intention of advertising, and a decision 
                                                 
30
 As the Commission has stated, however, ‘the co-regulatory and self-regulatory schemes have to be broadly accepted 
by main stakeholders in the Member States concerned and provide for effective enforcement. How these concepts of 
acceptability and effectiveness are interpreted can be decided at national level’; similarly for the interpretation of the 
terms ‘encourage’ and ‘monitor’: see the minutes of the meeting of the EU Platform held on 19 November 2008 and 
whose afternoon was devoted to the role of the EU Platform on Diet, Nutrition and Physical Activity in relation to 
marketing and advertising, available at: 
 <ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/nutrition/platform/docs/ev_20081119_mi_en.pdf>, at paragraph 8. 
20 
 
needs to be taken on whether this alone is sufficient to protect them, as in the case of tobacco 
products or medicines and medicinal treatments available only on prescription, thus raising the 
question whether older children are able to act in their own long-term interests. The principle of the 
best interests of the child and the principle of the evolving capacities of the child should be focal 
points in this debate. 
 
Finally, and very signifcantly, self-regulation is unlikely to provide a suitable regulatory mechanism 
to protect children effectively from exposure to unhealthy food marketing. Self-regulation is, by 
definition, voluntary and, as such, cannot guarantee that all food operators will abide by the relevant 
standards.
31
 Furthermore, evidence suggests that food operators exploit loopholes in the regulatory 
framework. For example, while they have accepted to adopt codes of conduct limiting television 
and internet advertising to children – two media on which most of the attention has focused so far – 
they have simultaneously invested in new media falling outside the scope of the rules, including 
advergames or mobile phone marketing, as well as in store promotions (Harris et al., 2009). More 
fundamentally, one may question whether the food industry should be required to ‘shoot itself in the 
foot’ and stop using all the (legal) means at their disposal to increase their customer base in the 
absence of binding regulation obliging them to do so. Is it not the very purpose of commercial 
expression to try and increase (and at the very least maintain) one’s market shares? (Garde, 2010a). 
Corinna Hawkes has shown the structural limitations of self-regulatory systems to address the 
problem of unhealthy diets among children. She argues that self-regulation aims to protects 
advertisers (from external regulation) as well as consumers, thereby facilitating the proliferation of 
advertising. Self-regulation in the advertising sector may therefore be a win-win situation for 
consumers and advertisers alike when it is about avoiding misleading advertising – a commercial 
                                                 
31
 Self-regulation has been defined as ‘the possibility for economic operators … to adopt amongst themselves and for 
themselves common guidelines at European level’ (European Parliament, Council and European Commission, 2003, 
para 22). 
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practice which harms consumers as well as competitors’ interests. Nevertheless, the question arises 
what if perfectly truthful advertisements send out messages inconsistent with public policy goals, as 
tends to be the case with food advertising (Hawkes, 2005). The question is all the more relevant in 
light of the fact already mentioned above that companies often use a variety of marketing practices 
to influence children’s dietary choices (Hawkes, 2005; Ludwig and Nestle, 2008; Sharma et al., 
2010). Hawkes convincingly states: 
 
‘Current systems remain concerned with the content of individual marketing campaigns – 
whether they are truthful or not – not the alleviation of a public health problem. Yet it is not 
just individually misleading, deceptive or offensive marketing campaigns that are the cause 
for concern, but the cumulative effects of perfectly legal, truthful marketing campaigns, 
appearing in many forms, times and places . . . In other words, self-regulation cannot 
prevent marketing that works.  
 
There is thus an important disjuncture between the laudable (and necessary) aim of the self-
regulatory organisations to prevent misleading, deceptive advertising that exploits the 
credulity of children, and the very different aim of preventing the effects of advertising on 
children’s diets . . . In the system, there are no grounds to complain about the amount of 
advertising, or where it is, as long as it is honest and truthful.’ 
 
Consequently, it is only if the cumulative effects of the marketing of unhealthy food on children’s 
health is taken into account that self-regulation may work to fight childhood obesity. This will 
require, in turn, that the very aims of self-regulation are reconsidered so that self-regulation is no 
longer solely intended to support manufacturers by ensuring that none of them engage in 
commercial practices allowing them to gain an unfair competitive advantage, but that it also 
protects consumers, and vulnerable consumers more specifically, by restricting the exposure to, and 
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the impact of, certain forms of marketing. It is however counter-intuitive to consider entrusting the 
food industry with the task of curtailing the promotion of the products it has lawfully placed on the 
market. The sales of these products reap large profits and marketing to children has proven a very 
effective means to increase sales figures. Stakeholders have different roles to play in matters 
pertaining to overweight and obesity prevention, and their respective roles should not be confused 
(Ludwig and Nestle, 2008). 
 
The issue of the regulation of the marketing of unhealthy food to children in light of growing 
childhood obesity rates has given rise to debate both within and beyond the European Union. The 
set of recommendations endorsed by the Sixty-third World Health Assembly on 21 May 2010 
expressly calls upon Member States to reduce both the exposure to and the power of unhealthy food 
marketing to children (World Health Organisation, 2010). Quite significantly, the 
Recommendations acknowledge the central role of state authorities in the policy making process: 
 
‘Government should be the key stakeholders in the development of policy and provide 
leadership through a multi-stakeholder platform for implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. In setting national policy framework, governments may choose to allocate 
defined roles to other stakeholders, while protecting the public interest and avoiding conflict 
of interest’ (Recommendation 6).  
 
Even if the Recommendations do not go as far as prescribing the approach which Member States 
should adopt, they nonetheless require that ‘whole industry sectors’ should abide by the standards 
they have adopted to regulate themselves. Moreover, the approach (which should be ‘the most 
effective to reduce marketing to children of [unhealthy] foods’) must be ‘set within a framework 
developed to achieve the policy objectives’, which suggests that Member States may not abdicate 
their overall responsibility. This should be interpreted as requiring that Governments should set the 
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standards which food industry operators must uphold. It is only at the implementation and/or at the 
evaluation and monitoring stages of the policy process that Governments may allocate defined roles 
to other stakeholders, including industry operators. Finally, ‘the policy framework should specify 
enforcement mechanisms and establish systems for their implementation’ and include ‘clear 
definitions of sanctions’ and ‘a system for reporting complaints’. The Recommendations therefore 
highlight how much more the European Union should do in terms of policy development, policy 
implementation, policy monitoring and evaluation to ensure that the best interests of the child 
principle is effectively upheld.
32
 
 
Stricter national standards 
 
As the AVMS Directives is a measure of minimum harmonisation (as was the TVWF Directive), 
Member States are entitled to apply stricter requirements for audiovisual media service providers 
established on their territories.
33
 In particular, the UK has, following an extensive consultation 
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 Two remarks are warranted at this stage: firstly, the EU itself is not a signatory party to Resolution WHA63.14 and 
therefore to the Recommendations. Nevertheless, all 27 Member States are; the EU should therefore support them in 
implementing their international commitments rather than frustrate their efforts to do so. Secondly, it is not 
suggested that the EU should comprehensively regulate food marketing to children: the EU only has attributed 
powers (Article 5 TEU). In particular, it does not have general competence to harmonise national laws on health 
grounds (Article 168 TFEU, ex-Article 152 EC); and, as the ECJ has confirmed in the Tobacco Litigation, it is only 
if the regulation of marketing has a cross-border effect that the EU may intervene: Case C-376/98 Germany v 
Council and the European Parliament [2000] ECR I-8419 and Case C-380/03 Germany v Council and the 
European Parliament [2006] ECR I-11573. Thus, the EU can regulate cross-border food advertising involving 
media such as television, the internet, the radio, but probably not in-store or in-school marketing (except for food 
labeling regulation). By analogy with tobacco advertising, it could also regulate the sponsorship of international 
events by food operators, but not the sponsorship of local events (Garde, 2010a). 
33
 Their freedom is nonetheless subject to the limits set by Treaty provisions, and Article 34 TFEU (ex-Article 28 EC) 
on the free movement of goods and Article 56 TFEU (ex-Article 49 EC) on the free movement of services more 
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process, adopted measures which go beyond the narrow confines of Article 9(2) of the AVMS 
Directive and are therefore more likely to reduce the impact of marketing for unhealthy foods on 
children. These measures, which came into effect on a phased basis from April 2007 to January 
2009, include a total ban of unhealthy food advertising in and around all children’s television 
programming and on dedicated children’s channels as well as in youth-oriented and adult 
programmes which attract a significantly higher than average proportion of viewers under the age of 
16. In addition to general content rules requiring responsible advertising to all children at all times, 
Ofcom has also introduced new rules on the content of advertisements targeted at primary school 
children which ban the use of celebrities and characters licensed from third-parties (such as 
cartoons), promotional claims (such as free gifts) and health or nutrition claims.
34
 These restrictions 
therefore tackle both the exposure of children to unhealthy food marketing and the power of certain 
marketing techniques on them.  
 
In July 2010, Ofcom published its final report intended to measure the effectivceness of the 
restrictions which had been introduced. The evaluation exercise noted that exposure to unhealthy 
food advertising was eliminated during children’s airtime (including both children’s channels and 
children’s slots on other channels). More generally, it estimated that scheduling restrictions were 
achieving the objective of reducing significantly the number of HFSS product advertising impacts 
(i.e. each occasion when a viewer sees an advert) among children aged 4–15 years: in 2009, 
compared with 2005 estimates, children saw around 37% less HFSS advertising (i.e. a reduction of 
4.4 billion impacts). This meant, in terms of age groups, that younger children (4-9 year olds) saw 
52% less (3.1 billion impacts), while older children (10–15 year olds) saw 22% less (1.4 billion 
                                                                                                                                                                  
specifically. Article 4 of the AVMS Directive indeed provides that ‘Member States shall remain free to require 
media service providers under their jurisdiction to comply with more detailed or stricter rules in the fields 
coordinated by this Directive provided that such rules are in compliance with Union law’. 
34
 Details can be found on Ofcom’s website: <www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/foodads_new/>. 
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impacts) (Ofcom, 2010).  These findings suggest that the UK regulatory framework has, to date, 
dealt much more effectively than the AVMS Directive with the need to reduce the exposure of 
children to unhealthy food marketing. Moreover, Ofcom’s final review has also established that 
children saw less advertising featuring licensed characters (-84%), brand equity characters (-56%), 
other characters (-2%) and promotions (-41%). As a result, children are exposed to significantly less 
unhealthy food advertising using techniques considered to be of particular appeal to children, even 
though such techniques continue to be used during adult airtime, as well as during children's airtime 
to promote non-HFSS products (Ofcom, 2010).
 
This confirms that the UK regulatory framework 
has also attempted to address the power of marketing techniques, the second component of the 
impact of marketing on children. Nevertheless, Ofcom has also found that advertisers have 
significantly increased the amount of HFSS advertising and sponsorship in periods outside 
children’s airtime, at times when significant numbers of children may be watching (Ofcom, 2010). 
These figures show that children were still seeing two thirds of the advertising of HFSS foods, thus 
confirming the shortcomings of limiting the ban on unhealthy food advertising to children’s 
programmes only.
35
 This example illustrates how much careful reflection will have to be carried out 
by Governments when implementing the WHO Recommendations: the best interests of the child 
principle indeed mandates that the notion of ‘marketing to children’ should be defined sufficiently 
broadly. 
 
The freedom which EU Member States have under the AVMS Directive to impose more stringent 
requirements is nonetheless strictly circumscribed, as it is conditional not only on their compliance 
                                                 
35
 ‘Despite an increase in the volume of HFSS advertising aired throughout the day, children’s exposure to HFSS 
advertising fell in all day parts before 9pm and by 25% between the peak hours of 18:00-21:00.These reductions 
were driven by the decline in impacts during children’s airtime’. 
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with Union law,
36
 but also on their compliance with the State of establishment principle which 
obliges them to ensure freedom of reception without restricting the retransmission on their territory 
of audiovisual media services from other Member States for reasons which fall within the fields 
coordinated by the AVMS Directive.
37
 The De Agostini judgment of the ECJ provides a good 
illustration of how the transmitting State principle and the principle of minimum harmonisation 
interact with each other.
38
 In this case, Article 11 of the Swedish Broadcasting Act, which bans 
television advertising to children of less than 12 years old, was challenged as contrary to the 
provisions of the TVWF Directive. The ECJ held that the transmitting State principle only allowed 
Sweden to enforce its ban on children advertising on broadcasts emanating from its own territory,
39
 
but not on television broadcasts transmitted from the UK. The scope of this judgment should now 
be extended, following the adoption of the AVMS Directive, to all other audiovisual media services 
falling within its scope, including the Internet and video-on-demand services. One may therefore 
conclude that the combination of the transmitting State principle with the principle of minimum 
harmonization strictly limits, without however negating, the freedom of Member States to 
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 In matters of public health and lifestyle choices, it is likely that the Court would be reluctant, in the absence of EU 
harmonising measures, to curtail too drastically the discretion of national authorities to adopt measures supporting 
their obesity prevention strategies, subject to the principle of proportionality (Garde, 2010b). For an analogy with 
the regulation of alcohol advertising, see Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795) and 
Case C-429/02 Bacardi France [2004] ECR I-6613, where the ECJ refused to hold near total bans on alcohol 
advertising in breach of the principle of proportionality. 
37
 Article 3(1). Article 2(1) however requires that ‘each Member State shall ensure that all audiovisual media services 
transmitted by media service providers under its jurisdiction comply with the rules of the system of law applicable to 
audiovisual media services intended for the public in that Member State’. The State of establishment principle has 
also been referred to as the transmitting State principle or the country of origin principle. 
38
 Case C-34/95 De Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843. 
39
 This freedom is subject to Sweden’s compliance with the general Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods 
and services (respectively Articles 34 and 56 TFEU (ex-Articles 28 and 49 EC). 
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implement coherent strategies aimed at curbing childhood obesity levels on their territories. As the 
Recommendations state, it is extremely important that Member States collaborate on the regulation 
of cross-border marketing (World Health Organisation, 2010). Nevertheless, cross-border marketing 
may only be dealt with satisfactorily if competent authorities take a high level of public health 
protection as a basis for action.
40
  
 
One may hope that the review of the AVMS Directive which is due to take place at the end of the 
year 2011 will acknowledge the shortcomings of its provisions on marketing to children. The best 
interests of the child require a much stronger commitment of EU institutions, in light of existing 
evidence, that marketing negatively impacts on children’s consumption choices, health and 
development. This will require, in turn, a more refined approach than has been adopted so far, 
distinguishing different groups of children depending on their different needs, thus acknowledging 
that children are not a homogenous group. 
 
Concluding remarks: Towards the Effective Mainstreaming of Children’s Rights in EU 
Internal Market and Consumer Policy? 
 
As the Committee on the Rights of the Child has clearly stated, rhetorical statements that children’s 
rights should be upheld cannot suffice. The means must be in place to ensure that they are 
effectively upheld: 
 
‘Ensuring that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in all actions 
concerning children (Article 3(1)), and that all the provisions of the UNCRC are respected in 
legislation and policy development and delivery at all levels of government demands a 
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 In the EU, the obligation to mainstream public health into all EU policies is mandated by Articles 114(3) and 168(1) 
TFEU (ex-Articles 95(3) and 152(1) EC). 
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continuous process of child impact assessment (predicting the impact of any proposed law, 
policy or budgetary allocation which affects children and the enjoyment of their rights) and 
child impact evaluation (evaluating the actual impact of implementation). This process needs 
to be built into government at all levels and as early as possible in the development of policy’ 
(Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2003, para 45). 
 
To assist the development of evidence-based policies, the EU should rely more systematically on 
child impact assessment, particularly when the EU intervenes in a policy area through legislative 
means, thus restricting the freedom of Member States unilaterally to adopt more protective standards 
at national level. Monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of policies ex post is a valuable, even 
an essential, exercise. Nevertheless, anticipating the consequences of policies ex ante on the basis of 
solid integrated child impact assessments will ensure that proposals are sustainable and will 
therefore increase their chances of success at a much earlier stage.  
 
In the EU, all major policy initiatives with a potential economic, social and/or environmental impact 
require an integrated impact assessment. This applies in particular to most legislation (proposed 
directives or regulations) and to White Papers, action plans, expenditure programmes and 
negotiating guidelines for international agreements.
41
 The Commission has published a series of 
impact assessment guidelines which are intended to give general guidance to the Commission 
services for assessing potential impacts of different policy options.
42 Unfortunately, children’s rights 
are not singled out: they fall within the three broad categories of economic, social and environmental 
impact. There is therefore a risk that a proposal with a broad range of impacts fails to consider 
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 The Commission has completed over 400 impact assessments since 2002 when the impact assessment system was put 
in place. In 2008 alone, 135 were carried out: 
 <ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/ia_carried_out_en.htm>. 
42
 <ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/commission_guidelines_en.htm>. 
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potential impacts of a policy on children.
43
 The constitutional obligation of EU institutions to uphold 
the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in all policy areas supports the argument 
that children’s rights should be more clearly singled out.44 Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that 
child impact assessments are used to inform policy decisions, rather than to justify a preferred policy 
option determined independently from the impact assessment process.
45
 This is all the more 
important if policy is to rely on evidence rather than assumptions. A rigorous, objective child impact 
assessment is likely to contribute to the acceptance, in the longer term, by commercial operators, of 
the detrimental effects their practices may have on children and the need to curb such practices to 
effectively uphold the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in all EU policies, 
including the core area of internal market policy (Garde, 2010b).  
 
Apart from systematic child impact assessments and child impact evaluation, a stronger 
involvement of children’s rights advocates is also required in the legislative process, at the 
consultation, drafting and evaluation stages of policies. The mainstreaming of children’s rights puts 
the onus on children’s rights organisations to step outside their comfort zone and acquire the 
necessary expertise to influence the agenda in the interrelated fields of internal market and 
consumer policy, which they have not traditionally recognised as priority items in their work. They 
need to contribute to (if not prompt) the debate as to where the best interests of the child lie in all 
the policy areas falling within the scope of the powers conferred upon the EU by the Treaties to 
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 One could draw an analogy with the EU’s obligation to mainstream public health concerns into all EU policies, as 
laid down in Article 168 TFEU (ex-Article 152 EC). A study conducted by the National Heart Forum found that in 
2005 and 2006, 73 out of the 137 impact assessments carried out by the Commission did not mention the word 
‘health’ (Salay and Lincoln, 2008, 13). 
44
 See Article 3 TEU and Article 24 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. 
45
 Information Note from the President to the Commission, ‘Better Regulation and Enhanced Impact Assessment’, 28 
June 2007, SEC(2007) 926. 
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ensure that children are adequately protected from all forms of commercial exploitation. 
 
The Commission’s most recent Communication on the Rights of the Child confirms that the EU 
internal market and consumer policies are not regarded as important to the EU children’s rights 
strategy, notwithstanding their fundamental role in the EU legal order (European Commission, 
2011). EU institutions, Member States, civil society and other stakeholders should all bear in mind 
that no policy is child neutral (De Vylder, 2004), and that the extended powers granted to the EU in 
internal market and consumer policies reinforce the importance of mainstreaming children’s rights 
and upholding the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in these areas of EU action. 
It is indeed high time ‘to move up a gear on the rights of the child and to transform policy 
objectives into action’ (European Commission, 2011, 3). As the Commission has underlined, ‘the 
rights of the child, guaranteed by Article 24 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, are one of 
the fundamental rights mentioned explicitly in the Commission’s Strategy. It is thus included in the 
“fundamental rights checks” which the Commission applies to relevant draft EU legislation’ 
(European Commission, 2011, 4). The practical significance of this statement will turn upon the 
definition given of the phrase ‘relevant draft EU legislation’. The broader the understanding, the 
more likely the Commission can live up to the promises it made in 2006 of mainstreaming 
children’s rights in all EU internal and external policies. 
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